One of the biggest moves the New Jersey Devils made in the 2024 offseason was hiring Sheldon Keefe as the head coach. This post looks at how the Devils were coached, how Keefe coached the Leafs, and what a compromise may look like.
Training camp has begun. All of the active and available players among the 68 at New Jersey Devils training camp has been on the ice. The team’s preseason starts on Sunday night against the Islanders. The 2024-25 NHL season is upon us. As such, questions will have to be answered over the next week. There are plenty of valid ones. Who fills out the bottom-six forwards? Who replaces Luke Hughes? How does a re-signed Dawson Mercer fit into the lineup (hint: Winger, Sheldon. Play him at wing)? For me, one of the biggest has to do with new head coach Sheldon Keefe. How will he coach the New Jersey Devils?
The Previous Situation in New Jersey
Lindy Ruff and interim head coach Travis Green led the bench last season for the Devils. That Ruff was fired in March and the Devils won 8 out of 21 games under Green immediately shows that how they coached the team was not effective. Still, what was it that they coached up the Devils to do?
Ruff and his staff’s tactics – something Green largely continued since he became an interim in March – can be summed up in a word: aggressive. They leaned heavily on transition offense, looking for quick defensive plays to stop the opposition and try to catch them in odd-man situations on the rush. In normal play in 5-on-5, they tended to go low-high; getting the puck in deep to establish possession in the zone, winning the puck in the corners or behind the goal line, and then passing/moving the puck back to the points that would be open to make the next move. Something made more aggressive with defensemen being given the green light to “activate” or move in closer in the offensive zone. This created better shots and more opportunities for defenders to attack than just leaving them at the points – when it worked.
Defensively, they swarmed it up with two defensemen typically converging on a puck carrier to try to contain them. The power play is the common 1-3-1 formation you see in the NHL with the penalty kill utilizing a diamond (a.k.a. a 1-2-1) around the slot. There was not a lot of passive coverage on defense and the offense was rush-based, being absolutely difficult to deal with if those transition opportunities were realized – especially if the forward was a quick, skilled one like The Big Deal or Jesper Bratt.
The problem with all of this aggressive play is the same problem with being too aggressive in football. If the aggressive plays do not work, then the team is in trouble and the opposition can punish them repeatedly. If the transitional offensive opportunities were not there or teams dropped back a bit to guard against rushes, then the offense suffered. The high-low strategy is a standard one in 5-on-5 and oppositions often had a forward on a halfwall or in a circle or even by the defensemen ready to cut off the offensive possession early. And given how often a defenseman would activate, it was a real possibility that one player could be left back scrambling against an odd-man rush. The 1-3-1 power play was prone to aggressive forechecks by penalty killers, especially when the play would go back to the one defenseman (Dougie Hamilton, Luke Hughes, Simon Nemec, it didn’t matter).
Worst of all, in my opinion, was the swarming on defense. If the converging on the puck carrier did not win the puck or the puck carrier was able to move the puck away, there was often a lot of open space for the opposition. Especially in front of the net since the defensemen swarming or skaters swarming may not leave someone there or have someone even looking at the weakside. Which is where the puck often would go for a scoring chance. Combine that with real poor goaltending performances and that is how a team with an around-league-median high danger scoring chance rate in 5-on-5 and an around-league-median xGA/60 rate in 5-on-5 yielded one of the highest actual goals against rates in the NHL in 5-on-5. Something that actually led to a lot more losses than, say, a perception of “not being tough enough.” Sorry, Ken Daneyko.
The Previous Situation in Toronto
Meanwhile, Toronto’s rates in HDCA/60 and xGA/60 were not too different from New Jersey’s in 5-on-5. They did not give up nearly as many goals; a 2.51 GA/60 rate is much better than 2.81 GA/60. Yet, that was not simply a case of Toronto just having better goaltending. As confirmed through Jack Han’s Hockey Tactics 2024, Keefe coached the Leafs very differently than Ruff did with the Devils.
On defense, the Maple Leafs not only did not swarm puck carriers as much, but they employed something Keefe called “Fight the Panic” when Han was an assistant under Keefe with the Marlies. The basic point is that they played much more slowly on defense and the focus was to avoid pressure from opposing offenses to have safer exits. A very, very different mindset compared with getting quick exits like the Devils did under Ruff and Green. It also would lead to fewer disasters like getting caught not covering players in dangerous spots.
In the neutral zone, whereas the Devils played a standard 1-2-2 trap, the Leafs played a 1-3-1 formation with a defenseman pushing up to the center part of the rink and the second and third forwards dropping back on the sides. This can allow for counter-attacks like a 1-2-2 does in theory if the opposition is “trapped” to a side, but also provides a defenseman to activate more quickly. Something that could be a benefit, especially for someone like Hamilton, Hughes, and Nemec. In 5-on-5 offense in the zone, instead of going high-low, the Leafs looked to get the puck in deep and look for options from below the goal line, such a shooter in the slot or beneath the dots in the circles. This was risky in that a missed or defended pass leads to pucks heading towards the blueline and allowing opponents to counter-attack on rush plays. It also kept defensemen at the points instead of joining the attack, something very common under Ruff. While Han’s guide highlighted the risks of Keefe’s tactics, it also showed a more measured, conservative mindset in Toronto. While the lack of playoff success eventually ended Keefe’s time in Toronto, the team was a solid 5-on-5 squad and won plenty of games on more than just having talented guys up front.
The Jimmy’s and Joe’s
The consistent philosophical battle of coaches in all of sports is whether the coach fits the players to follow the tactics and game plan or the tactics and game plan are modified to fit the players. Who management – current or past – brought in to play is always going to be a confounding factor. Not to mention how opponents respond to said tactics. There is no perfectly pure way or right answer to that question. There is give and take in everything. However, when the players and the system largely align, it can really elevate a team. Just look at the New Jersey Devils from 1993-94 to 1997-98.
Sheldon Keefe is the head coach and not the GM. While I would hope he has some kind of a awareness as to who came in this offseason and who is on the team, he did not make the decisions to sign or not sign players. He has to deal with whom Tom Fitzgerald kept, let go, brought in, and major names that are locked in for the foreseeable future. You are probably aware of who they are, but here is a quick review of the major names from the offseason:
Gone: John Marino, Alexander Holtz, Akira Schmid, Graeme Clarke
Acquired: Jakob Markstrom (no movement clause), Brett Pesce (no trade clause), Brenden Dillon (no trade clause), Tomas Tatar, Stefan Noesen (10 team no trade list), Johnathan Kovacevic, Paul Cotter
Re-Signed: Kurtis MacDermid, eventually Dawson Mercer
Locked In (major contracts and clauses): The Big Deal, Timo Meier (no movement clause), Jesper Bratt (no movement clause). Nico Hischier (10 team no trade list), Ondrej Palat (no movement clause), Erik Haula (no trade clause), Dougie Hamilton (no movement clause), Jonas Siegenthaler (10 team no trade list)
The last group is very notable as it includes much of the major players on this roster. Should Keefe want Fitzgerald to move them, then it is going to be difficult given their clauses and how much money has been committed to them. In other words, Keefe has to make it work with those players. And add Pesce, Dillon, and Noesen to that since Fitzgerald just signed them, signed them to at least three seasons, and each has some kind of clause limiting their movement. Keefe has to come up with a tactic knowing the team is committed to 11 of the 18 skaters to lineup in a game this season.
As far as the players brought in and retained, the Devils are certainly big
This means it is important that Keefe assesses their abilities and comes up with something that their skills are suited for while also not exposing them/the team like the tactics under Ruff. This is exactly what training camp and preseason is for and why missing on-ice and off-ice activities due to injury (Luke Hughes) or a contract (Mercer) is a detriment. When the season begins in earnest, it will be much harder to have practices – much less have drills to breakdown what the plays and tactical approaches will be.
What I’d Like to See: A More Balanced Approach
I think Ruff’s (and Green’s) tactics were aggressive to a fault. It was reliant on rush offense, which was not always there; and the swarming on defense was beaten by the opponents way too many times. I think some of the concepts of Ruff’s coaching make sense or made sense with the teams he had. But In looking at Toronto’s tactics, I do not think what he did in Toronto last season should be applied in full in New Jersey.
For example, take the defense. Keefe instructing the Leafs to spend more time in their own end and look for safer spaces for exists invites additional risks. It will mean fewer rush plays for the likes of The Big Deal, Bratt, Hischier, and such. More time spent in the defensive zone gives more chances for the opposition offense to win pucks back, keep the skaters out longer, and break down the Devils. A balance will be needed – even if that just means swarming less and keeping players in a “traditional” positional-style coverage.
Likewise for the offense after establishing the zone. Activating too often invites the same risk of Keefe’s Leafs directing offense from down low: offensive zone turnovers can create killer odd man rushes against. Plus, telling someone like Hughes, Hamilton, or Nemec to not activate seems like a waste of what they can do to help the team. Not that I look to Pesce, Dillon, Siegenthaler, or the extras (DeSimone, Hatakka, Kovacevic) for offense, but giving them the greenlight to jump up when they think it would help can provide a breakthrough here and there in a game that could use one. A more measured approach may be necessary, perhaps activating if the opposition is not camping out waiting for the turnover from behind the goal line. Or even consider not leading the offense from the corners and endboards. The Devils have forwards that can do so from many locations, it does not have to be in-deep as a default. They could even consider a cycle on offense, something that has not been a thing in New Jersey for a while.
These are ideas and, of course, I will be happy with whatever works. The key is that the roster Keefe has is largely set for 2024-25. I think he has to strike the balance of being less aggressive without keeping the Devils from being able to use how they were built.
By the way: I have intentionally ignored the power play and penalty kill. Largely because that may be the realm of the assistants. New assistant Jeremy Cotillon may have his own take on the 1-3-1 or want something else entirely. Assistant Ryan McGill returns and so his penalty kill may remain unless Keefe or someone else higher up wants it to change. Again, preseason and training camp are the best times to start something different with that. We shall see if that changes. For Keefe as the head coach, the 5-on-5 play is the most common area of the ice and so I am more interested in how he plans that part of the game.
Your Take
Apologies if I get anything particularly wrong either from Han’s guide or how tactics operate in hockey. This is still an area I am learning. Primarily because it makes a huge difference as to how the game is played. A purely talented player on his own can rarely beat a gameplan that does not fit or does not work against an opponent. And, especially as a long time Devil fan, I know all too well how crucial a tactic can be when competing against squads of even vastly superior talent on paper. Once again, I remind you of the 1995 New Jersey Devils.